Dysfunctional Public Entity Boards

Political Interference in Boards of Directors across Africa: A Power Play with High Stakes

In the African corporate and public-sector context, the governance of boards of directors often stands at the junction of public service, strategic oversight and political dynamics. When political interference creeps into the boardroom, the consequences are far-reaching: weakened oversight, compromised fiduciary responsibilities, damaged stakeholder trust, stunted enterprise performance and, ultimately, risks to national development. Below is a concentrated analysis of this phenomenon followed by seven key recommendations to stem the tide and strengthen board integrity across the continent.

The Issue: How Political Interference Manifests and Why it Matters

Appointment of directors for political loyalty rather than competence
In several African jurisdictions, board appointments—especially in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or public entities—are heavily influenced by political affiliation, patronage networks or government ministers rather than independent selection on merit. For example, in South Africa it has been noted that board appointments remain “highly politicised, often prioritising party loyalty over sector expertise, financial acumen, and governance knowledge.”

The result: boards populated by directors who may be less independent, less focused on long-term strategy or fiduciary oversight, and more responsive to short-term political or populist priorities.

Undermined board independence and oversight

When boards are subject to overt or covert political direction—whether through ministerial interference, shareholder representatives acting politically, or sudden board dismissals—their capacity to exercise independent judgement, hold management to account and protect stakeholder interests is compromised. A study of African SOEs points to “the role of government as a single or dominant shareholder, which results in substantial political interference in the running of the SOCs.”

This erosion of independence weakens governance, increases risk of mis-management and reduces enterprise resilience.

Blurring of shareholder vs board roles and vested political interests

Politicians or political appointees sometimes act as shareholder representatives yet without clear fiduciary obligations, or they interject in operational decisions. In one South African context it was observed that the absence of clearly defined mandates generates ambiguity as to what constitutes the company’s best interests, while shareholder representatives are not subject to fiduciary obligations, making them susceptible to advancing “political expediency at the expense of corporate sustainability.”

This conflation of political management with corporate governance leaves the board function diluted and muddled.

Frequent removals or reshuffling of boards for political expediency

In many cases, boards are disbanded or directors removed when enterprises underperform, but such removals create continuity and accountability gaps. One report underscores how political agents responsible for interference were often the same who removed boards when companies struggled.

These disruptions erode strategic oversight, reduce institutional memory and raise the risk of “capture” of the board by transient political agendas.

Consequences: Weak performance, risk of corruption and jeopardised public interest

The chain of effects is clear: compromised board governance means weak oversight of management, poor risk management, less transparent decision-making, increased susceptibility to corruption or capture, and ultimately under-delivery of organisational mandates (whether in SOEs, public utilities or mixed enterprises). For example, the study regarding the South African Airways (SAA) demonstrates how political interference and patronage severely impacted the entity’s ability to execute its mandate.

On the broader scale, this damages investor confidence, undermines strategic national objectives, and negatively impacts inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Why Africa Needs to Take this Seriously

Scale of public and quasi-public enterprises: Many African economies remain heavily reliant on state-owned or mixed enterprises in critical sectors (energy, mining, transport, utilities). Their performance—and the governance of their boards—matters for national development and for sustaining investor confidence.

Fragile governance ecosystems: In contexts where institutional checks and balances are still maturing, political intrusion into boards exacerbates systemic risk.

Link to accountability and development outcomes: When boards cannot function independently, accountability to citizens, taxpayers and investors suffers; this directly impacts service delivery, infrastructure, and the achievement of broader development goals.

Investor and financial market implications: Political interference is a red flag for foreign investors and development finance institutions, which increasingly demand strong governance, transparency and risk mitigation mechanisms.

Seven Key Recommendations to Address Political Interference in Boards

1. Establish clear, merit-based and transparent nomination & appointment processes – Design board selection protocols that emphasise skills, sector experience, diversity, independence and minimal party-political affiliation. Appointment committees should be multi-stakeholder (including non-political actors such as independent experts or civil society where appropriate) and publish criteria and rationale for appointments. Consider fixed term limits for board members and staggered terms to reduce wholesale political replacements.
2. Enshrine board independence and clarify roles of shareholder(s) vs board – Legally or in enterprise charters formalise that the board has independent decision-making and oversight authority, with the shareholder’s role confined to strategic oversight and appointment/removal (not day-to-day intervention). Ensure shareholder representatives (including in public enterprises) are subject to fiduciary duties akin to directors, to reduce political capture. This aligns with observations that when shareholder reps lack fiduciary duty, boards are vulnerable. Boards should be empowered to reject or escalate undue political interference and have whistle-blower mechanisms for board-level concerns.
3. Strengthen performance-based accountability and board evaluation – Require regular independent evaluations of the board (and board committees) – covering governance effectiveness, stakeholder alignment, risk oversight, integrity of decision-making. Remuneration and renewal of board members should be linked to clear performance metrics and oversight responsibilities, not patronage. Public disclosure of board and executive performance (within confidentiality limits) increases external accountability and reduces space for political manipulation.
4. Develop and enforce robust governance codes and regulatory oversight – Governments should adopt or strengthen national corporate governance frameworks (for both private and public enterprises) that explicitly address state-owned entity governance, board independence and political neutrality. For instance, studies in South Africa point to the need for an «overarching SOC law» to harmonise governance frameworks. Regulatory bodies (or oversight commissions) should monitor board composition, appointment procedures, incidents of board dismissal or interference, and report publicly. Enforcement mechanisms (sanctions, disqualifications, delinquents lists) should be in place for directors who neglect their duties, or boards that are found to have been unduly manipulated.
5. Promote transparency, stakeholder engagement and civil society oversight – Board minutes, key governance decisions, and appointment processes should be made accessible (to appropriate level) to stakeholders, including public interest groups, investors and regulators. Stakeholder forums (e.g., investor groups, labour, civil society) should have structured avenues to raise concerns about governance interference. Encourage external audits and governance reviews with public disclosure of findings; this makes political interference less covert and more visible.
6. Institute protection mechanisms for board autonomy – Develop protocols or legal protections that limit the ability of political actors to remove, restructure or replace boards outside of established governance processes. For example, requiring cause and formal procedure rather than ministerial fiat. Boards should have ability to seek legal or regulatory redress when interference compromises their mandate. Whistle-blower protection should extend to board members and senior governance actors who surface attempts at undue political pressure.
7. Capacity building, diversity and independence culture – Invest in training and development for directors (especially non-executive directors) in governance, risk oversight, fiduciary duties, strategic thinking and the public-sector context. Move toward greater diversity in board composition – not only in terms of gender and ethnicity, but professional background (risk, auditing, sector expertise), and independent thought. Diverse boards are more resilient to capture. Foster a culture of independence within boards: value constructive dissent, encourage independent committee chairs, separate roles of CEO and board chair, enforce conflict-of-interest policies. Encourage periodic rotation and renewal of board membership to avoid long-term entrenchment of politically aligned directors.

Conclusion

Unchecked political interference in the governance of boards across Africa is more than a theoretical governance issue—it is a high-stakes problem that undermines enterprise performance, institutional accountability and national development. The boardroom should not be a battleground for party politics. Rather, it must remain a forum of strategic oversight, fiduciary responsibility and stakeholder stewardship.

By adopting rigorous appointment processes, reinforcing board independence, elevating transparency, and building governance capacity, African countries can much more effectively insulate boards of directors from the distortions of political interference—and thereby strengthen both enterprise and national resilience. The seven recommendations offered provide a practical toolkit to reshape board governance in line with global best practice and local imperatives.